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The 2016 St.Gallen International Competition Law Forum ICF will serve as the backdrop for 
discussions on a variety of current competition law, economics and policy topics. One of the panels 
is going to focus on the future of competition law in Switzerland. 
 
As Dr. Marino Baldi points out: “the Swiss Cartel Act of 1995 entered into force almost exactly 20 
years ago. In 2003, a review of the law was conducted which mainly related to the introduction of 
direct sanctions. In 2011 the Swiss Government made some further proposals to amend the law. 
These proposals were turned down by the Swiss Parliament in 2014. Many think this is no great pity. 
Nevertheless, one or another of the Government's proposals might be worth being considered again, 
perhaps not exactly in the same way as before. I am thinking in particular of improvements in the law 
concerning private enforcement. In addition, there have recently been intense discussions of certain 
features in the law which might also sooner or later end in legislative proposals.” 
 
The following interview between FORMER AMBASSADOR DR. MARINO BALDI (Senior Counsel, Prager 
Dreifuss) and NICOLAS BIRKHÄUSER (Partner and Attorney-at-Law, Niederer Kraft & Frey), PROF. DR. 
ANDREAS HEINEMANN (Professor of Commercial, Economic and European Law, University of Zurich 
UZH; Vice-President, Swiss Competition Commission) and DR. RETO JACOBS (Partner and Attorney-
at-Law, Walder Wyss) offers you some food for thought and a starting point for our panel 
discussion. 
 
Join us in St.Gallen on May 19th and 20th for the “SWISS COMPETITION LAW - QUO VADIS?” panel. 
More information about the conference and a list of the remaining panels and speakers is available on 
www.sg-icf.ch. 
 
 
 
1. Erheblichkeit: "de-minimis rule" vs. "rule of 
reason" 
 
MARINO BALDI: Article 5 of the Swiss Cartels 
Act (SCA) contains the rules on restrictive 
agreements. One of the most disputed 
question relating to this Article concerns the 
test that triggers off the application of the 
provision. Under EU law the respective test is 
about whether a particular agreement has an 
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"appreciable effect" on competition. The 
German term under EU law for appreciable is 
"spürbar". The idea of the respective criterion 
is to sift out agreements that have only a 
"minor effect" on competition. The Swiss law 
uses the term "erheblich" instead of "spürbar". 
This has led a number of Swiss commentators 
to argue that "erheblich" stands for a more 
ambitious test than "spürbar" – namely a test 
requiring a decision on the "appropriateness" of 
a restraint on competition in the sense of the 
American Rule of Reason. So far, neither the 
Swiss Competition Commission nor the 
Federal Administrative Tribunal has positioned 
itself clearly with regard to the issue. A 
decision is expected in the near future by the 
Federal Court of Justice (FCJ). 
 
 
Could you briefly explain what arguments 
speak in favour of either of the two solutions? 
Furthermore: Can the problem that some 
have with a mere de-minimis rule (instead of a 
full-fledged rule of reason) be related mainly 
to verticals (e.g. distribution agreements 
providing for territorial protection), and can it 
be argued that the real issue is of a more 
fundamental nature and has a lot to do with a 
perhaps unfortunate formulation of the legal 
presumptions on vertical agreements that 
came into the law via a parliamentary motion 
in 2003? After all, there might be little 
controversy, if any, as to whether horizontal 
agreements on prices or on the allocation of 
markets normally do have an effect on 
competition that justifies a thorough 
examination or, as the case may be, a straight 
verdict without an arduous preliminary test.  
 
NICOLAS BIRKHÄUSER: In response to your 
introductory remarks regarding significance, I 
agree that the terms "spürbar" or appreciable 
under EU law and "erheblich" or significant 
under Swiss law are not the same. The 
difference between EU and Swiss competition 
law does however not primarily lie in the 
different terms, but in the different concepts 
of the competition laws. According to Article 
96 of the Swiss Constitution, "the 
Confederation shall legislate against the damaging 
effects in economic or social terms of cartels and 
other restraints on competition." According to 
Article 101 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union) "any agreements or 
decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall 
be automatically void." These two concepts are 
different. The Swiss Constitution requires a 
competition law that is directed against 
damaging effects, i.e. an effects based 
approach. Competition law in Switzerland 
cannot prohibit cartels and other restraints on 
competition as such, but only their actual 
damaging effects. Accordingly, under Swiss 
law, conducts can only be prohibited if they 
actually significantly restrict competition, 
because, if there is no actual restraint on 
competition, there can be no damaging effects 
in economic or social terms. Conducts that do 
not significantly restrict competition are lawful 
under Swiss law. Differently, the TFEU 
stipulates that certain categories of conducts 
are automatically, i.e. per se, void. 
 
In response to your question what arguments 
speak in favour of the two solutions, i.e. of the 
effects based approach or the "more ambitious 
test" that you mention on the one hand and of 
the per se prohibition approach on the other 
hand, I should, at this point, only mention a 
few arguments, thereby limiting my answer to 
Swiss competition law. One argument that 
appears to be brought forward against the 
effects based approach rather often is that the 
effects based approach requires a thorough 
examination and an "arduous preliminary test" 
as you state. One argument in favour of the 
effects based approach is that only conducts 
that actually restrict competition and that 
have damaging effects are prohibited, which 
allows to restrict private autonomy and the 
constitutional right of economic freedom only 
to the extent that there is an actual significant 
restraint on competition and damaging effects. 
The proponents of the effects based approach 
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argue that, where conducts do not actually 
restrict competition and have no damaging 
effects, there is no need to intervene. 
Personally I favour the latter view. Speaking of 
Switzerland, there is, in my view, anyway no 
basis to intervene where conducts do not 
actually restrict competition and have no 
damaging effects because Article 96 of the 
Swiss Constitution requires an effects based 
approach. 
 
 
Assuming that the wide interpretation – 
requiring a sort of Rule of Reason test - will 
be supported by the FCJ, how would you then 
describe the meaning of the efficiency test in 
Article 5 para. 2 SCA. Because Article 5 as a 
whole not only - more or less - mirrors 
Article 101 AEUV with respect to the so-
called "de-minimis rule", but also with respect 
to the exemption clause (Article 101 para. 3) 
which among Swiss lawyers is often referred 
to as the efficiency test. If the Swiss 
"Erheblichkeitstest" is given the meaning of a 
full-fledged US style Rule of Reason then there 
would under Swiss law be an overlap with the 
role of the efficiency test. The latter provision 
could in such a case be given the meaning of a 
device aimed at justifying any cartel according 
to economic or other policy considerations. Is 
this what the advocates of a broad 
Erheblichkeitstest have in mind?  
 
NICOLAS BIRKHÄUSER: It is interesting to 
analyse which parallels exist between the 
effects based approach according to Article 96 
of the Swiss Constitution and the rule of 
reason in the USA. I understand that the 
concept of the rule of reason is used to 
interpret the Sherman Act (which is itself 
strict and considers certain conducts as per se 
prohibited) in a way that certain conducts are 
only considered prohibited when they actually 
have effects on competition. Thus, the 
concept of the Sherman Act including the rule 
of reason in the USA and the concept of the 
genuinely effects based approach according to 
Article 96 of the Swiss Constitution in 
Switzerland appear to be different. However, 
there may be parallels with regard to the 
result of the assessment as I understand that, 
based on the rule of reason, the Supreme 
Court in the USA removed a number of 
conducts from the category of per se 
prohibited conducts and held that they are 
only prohibited subject to an effects based 
analysis under the rule of reason. This appears 
to apply in particular to vertical restraints. 
 
Considering your question whether there 
would be an overlap of the Swiss 
"Erheblichkeitstest" under Article 5 para. 1 
SCA, i.e. the requirement of an actual 
restraint on competition and of damaging 
effects, with the efficiency test under Article 5 
para. 2 SCA, i.e. the justification on grounds of 
economic efficiency, I do not think that there 
is an overlap: The test whether a conduct is 
justified on grounds of economic efficiency is 
not the same as – and does not replace – the 
test whether a conduct actually significantly 
restricts competition and has damaging effects. 
Conducts that do not actually restrict 
competition and have no damaging effects are 
lawful under Article 96 of the Swiss 
Constitution and cannot be prohibited, 
irrespective of whether they are efficient or 
not. The latter question does not need to be 
answered as there are no damaging effects. 
Only if competition is affected and if there are 
damaging effects, the question must be 
assessed whether certain conducts should 
nevertheless be permitted due to economic 
efficiency. 
 
 
 
2. Relative market power and dependency 
 
MARINO BALDI: Among the proposals that 
were refused by Parliament during the latest 
review exercise was also a provision aimed at 
introducing the concept of relative market 
power as a prerequisite of abusive behaviour - 
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in addition to the traditional concept of 
(absolute) market dominance. This addition 
proposed by a parliamentary motion was 
mainly thought to help combating the higher 
prices Swiss retailers often have to pay to 
manufacturers in EU countries, when 
compared to the prices retailers domiciled in 
EU countries have to pay. Strictly speaking, 
the concept of relative market power was 
already introduced into Swiss law in 2003 by 
way of a slight addition to the definition of 
market dominance, but the new proposal put 
forward in the Swiss Parliament aimed at 
giving the concept much more importance by 
adding language about economic dependence 
taken from German legislation (§ 20 para. 2 
German Law Against Restraints on 
Competition). This more explicit approach has 
in the meantime become the subject of a 
parliamentary initiative meant to supplement 
the present law (INITIATIVE SR ALTHERR).  
 
 
It is a matter of fact that Swiss retailers 
oftentimes have to pay significantly higher 
prices to manufacturers in the EU than do 
retailers domiciled in the EU. This contributes 
to the already high prices in Switzerland, 
primarily based on high costs – and thereby 
adversely affects the economic location 
Switzerland. Do you think new legal 
provisions such as the ones proposed can 
make a considerable contribution towards 
solving this problem? If yes, do you think the 
legal provisions as they have been applied in 
Germany now for over 40 years could be a 
model to be used in Switzerland? By the way, 
if in Switzerland a need is felt to become 
active in terms of competition law, could the 
language adopted in 2003 to clarify Swiss 
existing law (Article 4 para. 2 SCA) be a 
sufficient basis?  
 
RETO JACOBS: It is undisputed that for many 
products higher prices are charged in 
Switzerland than in other European countries. 
The reasons for these price differences are 
however not so obvious. While the selling 
companies cite the higher costs in Switzerland 
as being the main reason, the buyers argue 
that the sellers just want to profit from the 
wealth and the high spending capacity in 
Switzerland. The public opinion is clear: it 
demands measures against the high prices in 
Switzerland. If politics decides to follow this 
path the question should be asked whether 
the concept of relative market power would 
be the adequate approach. It should be 
considered that the mentioned price 
differences are not at all restricted to 
products sold by companies with a strong 
market position or brand. It rather seems to 
be a general phenomenon that most 
companies – irrespective of their market 
position – charge higher prices in Switzerland 
than in other European countries. Thus, it 
seems questionable that the higher prices are 
due to the seller’s market position and 
therefore, one should be rather careful in 
implementing a special regime for companies 
with such a position only. 
 
 
In the context of relative market power two 
main types of "economic dependence" may be 
distinguished. First, there is dependence 
relating to a strong brand which a retailer 
cannot afford not to sell in its shops (main 
concern of the INITIATIVE ALTHERR – example 
MIGROS/NIVEA). The second type of economic 
dependence is about relatively small 
manufacturers producing branded goods for 
the sale of which they cannot do without a 
particular large retailer (case COOPFORTE 
which was settled amicably, i.e. without a 
decision on the subject-matter). Would 
enhanced legal action regarding this latter type 
of dependence be desirable? 
 
RETO JACOBS: Since the 2003 revision Swiss 
law has allowed to take into account specific 
economic dependence while applying the rules 
regarding abuse of a dominant position 
(Article 4 para. 2 SCA). After more than ten 
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years, it is noticeable that there are hardly any 
cases in which this concept has been applied. 
Thus, the legislator should be rather reluctant 
in introducing further amendments in this 
direction because it could well be that in 
practice such economic dependence is not 
much of an issue. Otherwise we should have 
seen at least some cases coming up in the last 
few years. 
 
 
 
3. Private enforcement 
 
MARINO BALDI: Private enforcement of 
competition law has so far not been an 
important feature in any of the European 
jurisdictions. This stands in contrast to the 
much more developed US private antitrust 
enforcement system which, from its very 
beginning, has put the existence of subjective 
rights to claim damages in the centre of its 
endeavours to give effect to the law. In 
Europe, the awareness of the importance of 
private enforcement of competition law has 
only been growing in recent years. A 
significant step was taken when, in 2014, the 
EU passed its "Damages Directive for 
competition law claims" (Directive 
2014/104/EU) which has the aim to facilitate 
private claims in Member States under EU and 
national competition laws.  
 
In Switzerland the 1995 Cartel Act mainly 
introduced two novelties with a view to 
facilitating private enforcement. First, it 
harmonized – really unified - the substantive 
rules applicable in private law suits on the one 
hand and administrative proceedings on the 
other (before we had two different sets of 
rules). Second, given the complexity of certain 
competition law cases - and inspired by the 
"preliminary ruling system" in the EU - a 
provision was introduced (Article 15 SCA) to 
commit civil courts to asking the Competition 
Commission's view if a particular case is 
contentious as to its substantive qualification. 
Such an opinion is however not compulsory, 
unlike preliminary rulings under EU law would 
be.  
 
 
There is certainly room for further 
improvement of the Swiss system as it relates 
to private enforcement of the law, particularly 
as to claims for damages. In which respects 
should, according to you, such improvements 
mainly be envisaged? Would it, for instance, be 
a good idea to implement in our country 
more or less the same measures as are 
provided for in the aforementioned Directive 
of the EU? 
 
ANDREAS HEINEMANN: The situation in 
Switzerland of private enforcement of 
competition law is totally unsatisfactory. 
There is private enforcement in the books, 
but hardly in action. Up to today, there is only 
one successful court decision on cartel 
damages. From time to time, competition law 
is used as a shield against contractual claims by 
pleading the competition law invalidity of the 
underlying contract. The lack of practice is 
due to fundamental flaws of the legal 
framework (e.g. no standing of consumers). 
The interesting point is that during the 
deliberations on the reform of the Cartel Act, 
the need for improvement of private 
enforcement was not subject to doubt. The 
reform was rejected for other reasons. 
Therefore, I would highly recommend to 
include private enforcement into the next 
reform of competition law. 
 
Regarding substance, I think it is a good idea 
to evaluate carefully the EU Directive on 
Damages in competition law. The EU 
approach is characterized by the search of a 
middle way: On the one hand, the claims of 
victims shall become reality. On the other 
hand, a US style litigation culture – which by 
many in Europe is considered excessive – shall 
be avoided. The Swiss perspective shares the 
goal of striking a balance between these two 
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poles. The cornerstones of reform should 
therefore be an effective right to obtain full 
compensation for the harm suffered while 
renouncing on overcompensation through 
double or treble damages. The passing-on 
defence should be accepted, but the legislator 
should clearly attribute standing to 
consumers. Accepting passing-on while 
denying standing to consumers (which is the 
prevailing view) leads to no compensation at 
all if the harm has completely been passed 
through the distribution chain onto final 
consumers. Because of the phenomenon of 
scattered damages and rational apathy, 
collective redress should be introduced. It 
seems prudent to start with an opt-in system 
while observing the experience of countries 
like the UK which are introducing an opt-out 
system. The limitation period has to be 
extended, and limitation should be suspended 
during the administrative proceeding and 
during consensual dispute resolution. 
Moreover, there will be no progress of private 
enforcement if there is not a considerable 
easing of the plaintiff's access to evidence in 
the hands of the defendant. The approach of 
the EU Directive on this topic seems well 
balanced. 
 
The EU Directive may give a lot of inspiration 
for the reform of Swiss law. However, its 
contents have to be assessed critically. For 
example, it is hardly convincing that the 
principle of joint and several liability of all 
infringers shall under certain conditions not 
apply to small and medium enterprises. On 
the other hand, Swiss law should adopt 
explicit rules in fields not sufficiently covered 
by the EU Directive, for example on costs of 
litigation and on liability within groups of 
affiliated companies. 
 
 
Irrespective of any such new features, don't 
you think that a very important, or even 
indispensable, contribution towards advancing 
private enforcement activities would be a 
thoroughly convincing practice of the 
Competition Commission (and the Courts), in 
that such practice could provide for sufficient 
legal certainty as to the qualification of certain 
types of anticompetitive behaviour, thereby 
minimizing the procedural risk for claimants? 
 
ANDREAS HEINEMANN: I share the view that 
public and private enforcement of competition 
law stand in close relationship. It is certainly 
right that a competition authority (under the 
control of the courts) has the task of 
developing a case law which sheds light on the 
exact conditions for competition law 
application. Leading cases in all fields of 
competition law should be the result. 
However, experience shows that it takes a lot 
of time to get there. This year, we 
commemorate the twentieth anniversary of 
the entry into force of the Swiss Cartel Act. 
But still we are faced with difficulties 
concerning fundamental categories like the 
"significance" of a competition restriction. 
Therefore, we cannot expect fast results with 
respect to private enforcement, even less if 
new rules are introduced into the law. But it is 
certainly true that the barriers to private 
enforcement will decline to the extent that 
the contours of the competition law 
prohibitions become sharper. 
 
In this context, I would like to pick up the 
introductory remark you made: While the 
preceding legislation provided for differing 
rules, the Cartel Act of 1995 has harmonized 
substantive law for all purposes. Hence, the 
same substantive rules apply in public and in 
private enforcement. I have the impression 
that this fundamental achievement is not 
sufficiently reflected in practice. When applied 
by way of public enforcement, far-reaching 
requirements are sometimes read into the 
text which in a private lawsuit never could be 
established by the party bearing the burden of 
proof. Therefore, it would be very useful if 
public instances were more aware of the 
different enforcement mechanisms and the 
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need for a harmonized interpretation of 
substantive competition law for both public 
and private enforcement. On the other hand, 
the civil law judge should bear in mind the 
difficulty of establishing complex economic 
chains of effects and adapt the standard of 
proof accordingly. For this goal, the judge 
should be even more flexible when it comes 
to stand alone actions. 
 
Besides, while public enforcement can help to 
interpret substantive law, it is up to the civil 
law judge to identify the harm, to determine 
the quantum and to establish the causal link 
between infringement and the damages 
sustained. Public enforcement is of no great 
help for that although the EU Directive (in 
Article 17 para. 3) sets some hope into more 
interaction between private and public 
enforcement. Even if these expectations go 
too far, it would already be a very positive 
step if frictions between public and private 
enforcement could be reduced to a minimum. 
This is why decisions in public enforcement 
should be accepted as precedents in private 
enforcement, and why special protection of 
leniency applications is necessary when it 
comes to the availability of certain evidence 
produced in administrative or criminal 
proceedings.
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